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Revo

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  1. as of the lack of activity i give you PRO ,you seem interested to join the staff just be careful before posting topics
  2. Music title: DIPLOMATICO (Prod. By Hazer) Signer: ElGrandeToto Release date: 23/10/2024 Official YouTube link:
  3. Music title: Bo9al - JEFE (Official Music Video) Prod by Dino Signer: Bo9al Release date: 26/10/2024 Official YouTube link:
  4. Like the heavily memed girl in the Old El Paso advert, high-end audio company Noble wants to say something with its new FoKus Apollo over-ear headphones: “why not both?”. The new Noble FoKus Apollo are the first headphones to combine two different types of audio technology under the same band: dynamic and planar magnetic drivers, which should give audiophiles cause for interest. They’re also Noble’s first headphones too, marking a shift from its high-end wireless earbuds and wired in-ear monitors. To boil down tech jargon, planar magnetic drivers are the current trend in personal audio; fragile, expensive and fantastic-sounding, they’ve recently begun cropping up in some of the best headphones, and in (or on) audiophiles’ ears. Dynamic drivers are the stalwarts that the planar magnets have been replacing: these are reliable, hardy and relatively inexpensive, but are old news to audio fans who have been queuing up to get planar magnetic devices (as proven by the FoKus Apollo appearing as out of stock in plenty of stores I checked). Opposites come together in the Noble FoKus Apollo, and from a sound perspective it shows – in a good way. These headphones sound fantastic, with a detailed sound stage, high quality audio and lovely balance that provides an enticing neutral sound. I enjoyed using the Apollo so much for their audio chops that I started wearing them for movies, TV shows, meetings, games and just about anything else that requires my ears. Sound is clearly the focus of the FoKus (I had to do that once, okay?) with the feature set otherwise pretty limited. The noise cancellation is sufficient to take the edge off annoying noises but I could still hear the rumble of buses or thump of heavy rain on windows more than with some other products I’ve tested, so they won't be joinging our guide to the best noise-cancelling headphones any time soon. And there’s no built-in microphone, although an attachable one comes in the Apollo’s box. The box is pretty jam-packed actually, with Noble giving you a carry case and an assortment of cables, adaptors and extras. You can’t fault the company for offering value for your money. The battery life of the FoKus Apollo is perhaps even more impressive than its audio chops, with 60 hours of ANC-on listening time or 80 hours of ANC-off playback doubling many other rivals on the market. My personal low point during my testing of the Apollo was when someone commented how nerdy the headphones looked when worn – audiophiles might be used to this but they’re not a chic as other options on the market. However the low point for most people might be a bit earlier than that – at the checkout. The Noble FoKus Apollo are extremely expensive headphones, outstripping plenty of rivals, and even with the value added by extra cables and tools in the box they’re impossible to justify for audiophiles on a budget. If you think your purse or wallet can handle them, though, these are fantastic headphones that blow most of their rivals out of the water for sound quality alone. The Noble FoKus Apollo are not a cheap pair of headphones by any means. You have to shell out $649 / £589 / AU$999 to pick up a pair, which makes these some decidedly premium cans. You’re paying more for these headphones that best-in-class options like the Sony WH1000XM5s, Bose QuietComfort Ultra Headphones or Bowers & Wilkins PX8, though a select few options do cost more. It’s worth noting that the price includes extras like a carry case, 3.5mm cord, USB-C cable, several adaptors and a plug-in microphone, so Noble isn’t exactly ripping you off here. Noble unveiled the FoKus Apollo in the back half of 2024; the headphones seem to be on sale in various regions around the world, either from Noble’s website or from third-party stores, though in some places they’re sold out. To use the Noble FoKus Apollo, you can download the Noble FoKus smartphone app – I say ‘can’ because I only downloaded it towards the end of my testing period, and it didn’t add anything to the experience. You can easily use the Apollo without it. It does give me a handy shopping list of features to run through, though. First up there’s an equalizer, offering 10-band customization for people who know their way around an EQ tab, and six presets for those who don’t (which, to my ears, sounded very similar). Next is ANC, which can be toggled between on, off or ambient mode. The Apollo’s noise cancellation is decent, but it’s far from industry-leading, so while it stripped away the majority of background sounds it did always leave a little background hum that other buds and headphones I’ve tested would remove. If background sound was a cheesecake, the Apollo would be skipping that crumbly biscuit base. The app lets you toggle EQ, ANC, the tone switch for when you adjust settings on the headphones and… not a lot else. It’s a really barebones app, which doesn’t really justify its space on your phone since the EQ is the only feature which you can’t play with on the headphones themselves. A lightweight feature set isn’t something to get too heartbroken about, as these are clearly headphones designed with an audio focus. A ‘missing’ feature is the ability to take calls, as the FoKus Apollo don’t have a microphone built in (something I discovered the hard way: in a group meeting when I couldn’t figure out why people couldn’t hear me). A microphone comes in the box that you can connect to the headphone to mitigate this loss, but some might not like the fashion statement that this provides if worn in public. Curiously, Noble’s product listing details seem to imply that there’s a microphone, but I conducted several tests in different apps (yes, with the microphone toggled) and the Apollo could only pick up audio if the external microphone was connected. Thankfully the great battery life ensures that you can enjoy that audio for long periods of time: 80 hours, to be exact (though if you listen with ANC that drops to a still-impressive 60 hours). Given that 30 hours is considered the average lasting power by TechRadar’s staff, that’s a really fantastic figure. The Noble FoKus Apollo look more refined than your average headphones: the comfy padded band, the shiny metal pads with soft leather pads, and thin bands connecting it all make them look as much like an art piece as some headphones. They're also a bit bulkier than many other headphones on the market. This appearance covers up some flexibility issues though. While the cups can rotate around 180 degrees along the X axis (as in, they can face you or face away from you when on your head), they don’t move around much on the Y axis (as in, they can’t point down or up much, a move which is useful for catering to different head shapes). You also can’t fold up the cans, beyond the band length with some retractable space. Premium materials ensure that the Apollo feels comfortable to wear, if your head ensures you’re not affected by the flexibility problems, though long periods of listening may bring aches because of the weight of the cans. Each of the cans bears an orchestra of ports and buttons, which you’ll take a while getting used to. The left can has a microphone mute slider, a USB-C charging port and a 3.5mm jack (for the microphone), while the right can has an ANC toggle, another 3.5mm port, a volume rocker and a power button. I couldn’t find information about an IP rating for the Apollo, so I’d recommend caution when using them in potentially-harmful watery environments. Saying that, they survived a pretty heavy rainstorm around my neck. Due to the thin areas of band and the delicate internals, I always considered the Apollo to be quite fragile during testing, and treated them accordingly – I can’t say for sure whether these things are more susceptible to damage than alternatives, but I made sure to keep them in their case when possible just to be sure! The one and only color for the FoKus Apollo is gray, as you can see in the image, which has areas of silver and black as well. One thing I’d be remiss not to flag is the look of the Apollo when on one’s head – they look, for lack of a better word, a bit dweeby (something which was pointed out to me multiple times, making the descriptor 'divisive' feel apt). On all but the biggest heads the cans look huge too, so if you care about your looks and social standing, it’s something to bear in mind. The Noble FoKus Apollo enjoyed a four-week testing period, enough to put them through their paces in some rigorous tests. I mainly used the headphones while connected to an Android phone over Bluetooth but I also tested them alongside an iPad and a Windows computer via Bluetooth and 3.5mm cables. I tested the Apollo in a range of environments including my office, home, coffee shops, on buses and coaches, and also on walks around my neighborhood. As I mentioned before I mainly used them for audio streaming but used them on my iPad to stream basically the entire run of Shogun and a few movies. I've been reviewing gadgets for TechRadar for five and a half years now, including having tested countless headphones and earbuds. https://www.techradar.com/audio/wireless-headphones/noble-fokus-apollo-review-a-premium-set-of-headphones-that-delivers-olympian-audio-quality
  5. On the heels of Intel’s Arrow Lake release, board partners are releasing their new Z890-based motherboards to support the new CPU platform. These new boards utilize an updated LGA socket with an increased pin count (LGA1700 to LGA1815) for the new Core Ultra 200S series processors. The main takeaways from the new chips are improved IPC, increased efficiency, and, for the first time in several generations, hyperthreading is no longer. It’s all logical cores. You can find all those details and more in-depth analysis in our Intel Core Ultra 9 285K Review, while we’ll focus more on the motherboards here. Differences between Z790 and Z890 chipsets aren’t significant, but you get an increase from x16 to x20 PCIe 5.0 lanes from the CPU (PCIe 4.0 remains the same at x4). The chipset offers 24 PCIe 4.0 lanes, an increase of x4 from Z790, while DMI bandwidth on the board remains the same at x8 4.0 lanes. Last but not least, Z890 boards all have Wi-Fi 7 and 1 GbE or 2.5 GbE networking. Adding up all available lanes, we still have 48 total, but with different allocations. Thunderbolt 4/USB4 is baked into the CPU as well. MSI’s Z890 offerings, as of when this was published, consist of nine motherboards of varying sizes (ATX and EATX) and price points. At the top is the flagship/halo product in the Z890 Godlike ($1,000+?), followed by the Z890 Ace ($659.99), Z890 Unify-X ($???), Z890 Carbon WIFIi ($499.99), Z890 Edge Ti WIFI ($369.99), Z890 Tomahawk WIFI ($299.99), Pro Z890-A WIFI ($289.99), Z890 Gaming Plus WIFI ($269.99), and the Pro Z790-P WIFI ($239.99). We don’t yet see any MicroATX or Mini-ITX boards, but we hope to see those to come later and possibly on a lower chipset. MSI sent us (and presumably several other publications) a kit to complete this review for launch day. Inside the box, they provided the MEG Z890 Ace motherboard, a MAG I360 AIO, the Intel Core Ultra 9 285K processor, and some Kingston Fury Renegade CU-DIMMs for high-speed memory testing. To keep the testing system the same, we didn’t use the AIO, but it did receive positive reviews in our recent testing. It’s one of the few AIOs with the LGA1851 offset included at launch. Regarding the MEG Z890 Ace we’re reviewing here, we again see a premium aesthetic with the black finish and gold accents showing off the brand and model. MSI’s tagline states you get elite hardware system support and premium durability to support overclocking and high-speed DDR5 (including CU-DIMMS). Hardware-wise, you get five M.2 sockets (3 PCIe 5.0 x4), incredibly robust power delivery with the Frozr thermal design, several EZ DIY and EZ OC features, the “Ultra Connect” features including Wi-Fi 7, 10 GbE, and Thunderbolt 4, and the new Click BIOS X UEFI which is a breath of fresh air. Performance on our Intel Core Ultra 9 285K was good in most tests, with the increased IPC doing its best to compensate for the lack of hyperthreading and slightly slower clock speeds versus the i9-14900K. In several tests, it does, including rendering in Cinebench, Blender, POV-Ray, and encoding in Handbrake. Results in games were disappointing in F1 24 and Cyberpunk 2077, where it was notably slower than the Ryzen 9 9900X and i9 14900K. Testing across several more titles brings things a lot closer than our results across two games, but these outliers are real. Below, we’ll examine the MEG Z890 Ace's details and determine whether it deserves a spot on our Best Motherboards list. But before we share test results and dig deep into the board’s features, below are the specifications from the MSI website. Inside the Ace’s retail packaging are several accessories to help deliver a positive building experience. You get the typical collection of SATA cables, a quick-connect Wi-Fi antenna, and more, along with several other worthwhile items, including RGB extensions and thermistors. Below is a complete list of the extras. EZ Wi-Fi Antenna USB Drive (drivers) Cable labels (4) SATA cables EZ Front Panel cable 1 to 3 EZ Conn-cable (for RGB,V2) 1 to 2 RGB extension cable ARGB extension cable (2) Thermistor cables EZ M.2 Clip II remover tool EZ M.2 Clips II M.2 screw and standoff set Installation guide/regulatory notice As you’ll see with all Z890 boards, the Z890 Ace gets an updated design from Z790. Where most heatsinks used a brushed aluminum finish on Z790, the new model had a more textured finish and the same matte-black theme, even on the 8-layer server-grade PCB. We see the RGB backlit MSI Dragon on the oversized VRM heatsinks sporting the ‘wavy fin design,’ while multiple heat pipes spread the load among them, keeping the high-end power bits below running well within specification. You’ll find a second RGB lighting area on the top M.2 socket’s heatsink, illuminating the Ace branding. The Aura RGB software controls this and other attached RGB devices. Overall, I like the appearance, and the black-on-black with gold highlights screams MSI MEG Ace. Starting our tour in the upper left corner, we get a better look at the large heatsinks, MSI Dragon, and the MEG (MSI Enthusiast Gaming) branding spelled out above the miter-cut heatsink on the left. Above that is the wavy fin heatsink. Usually, we’d discuss the 8-pin EPS connectors now, but they aren’t here! Instead, we see the first 4-pin fan/pump headers (of eight in total) in that space. There is plenty of power to go around on these headers and they can support all of them running full-out when using the extra power connector (up to 420W max). The CPU_FAN1 outputs 2A/24W while the PUMP_SYS1-2 headers support up to 3A/36W. Finally, the System fans (1-5) are 1A/12W. You control fan speeds through the BIOS or within Armory Crate. Moving past the socket area to above the DRAM slots, we run into the two 8-pin EPS connectors to power the processor. Below those are four DRAM slots with the locking mechanism at the bottom (though there is room to get your fingers in there, I’d still like to see these on top). The Z890 Ace supports up to 256GB of ‘regular’ DIMMs and the new CU-DIMMS with their own internal clock driver. MSI lists support up to a mind-blowing DDR5-9200 - one of the fastest we’ve seen on any platform. Obviously, your mileage may vary, but we didn’t have any issues running the Kingston Fury Renegade 2x24GB DDR5-8200 kit (the fastest we have) by simply enabling XMP. 14th-gen Raptor Lake CPUs tended to struggle from around 8000 MT/s on, whereas this platform should consistently run those speeds and higher. In the upper right corner are three more 4-pin fan headers (CPU_FAN1, PUMP_SYS1, and SYS_FAN5), while just below that is the first 3-pin ARGB header. The other RGB headers run along the bottom edge. Next to this header are the four EZ Debug LEDs to help troubleshoot POST issues, while just below that is the 2-character EZ Digit Debug LED, which provides more detailed codes during POST and displays CPU temperatures by default once in Windows. As we continue down the right edge, we hit the 24-pin ATX power connector and a six-pin PCIe connector to enable 60W PD/QC4+ charging capability through the front panel Type-C port. Last but not least is MSI’s “EZ Conn” header, designed to connect the ARGB Gen1/2 LED strips, fans (MPG EZ120 ARGB fans), and USB 2.0 devices with the included cable. The Z890 Ace's VRMs are some of the most capable we’ve seen. The setup totals 28 phases, with 22 dedicated to the CPU/Vcore. It’s an all-Renesas brand power setup, from the RAA229131 PWM controller to the 22 110A SPS MOSFETs in a teamed configuration. The 2,420 Amps available for the processor will not limit your overclock, even if you’re into extreme overclocking using sub-ambient cooling methods. As is typical with most higher-end boards, you’re limited by CPU cooling before power delivery gets in the way. On the bottom half of the board, starting on the left, we run into the premium audio solution centered around the flagship Realtek ALC4082 codec. Supporting the codec is the ESS SABREESS9219Q Combo DAC/HPA, which can drive headphones with up to 600Ω impedance. Additionally, there are golden audio jacks (2 analog plus SPDIF optical) on the rear IO, de-pop protection, an isolated audio signal, and dedicated audio capacitors. This is one of the better audio solutions across any board. In the middle of the Z890 Ace are three full-length PCIe slots. The top two slots connect through the CPU and support PCIe 5.0 speeds. The top slot splits to x16, x8/x8, or x8/x8/x4, while the middle slot runs either x8 or x4/x4. The bottom PCIe slot connects through the chipset and runs at a maximum of PCIe 4.0 x4. There’s a lot of sharing involved in the CPU-connected slots. At a high level, the primary PCIe slot (PCIE_E1) runs at x16 when nothing po[CENSORED]tes PCIE_E2). If something is in that slot, it breaks down to x8. If you utilize M2_4’s ability to run at 5.0 speeds, the second PCIE slot runs at 5.0 x4 and the top at 5.0 x8. See the manual for full details. Five M.2 sockets occupy space in and around the PCIe slots. The top socket, M2_1, sports the largest heatsink and is where your fastest PCIe 5.0 drive should be installed. All sockets support 80mm modules except for M2_4, which can hold 110mm devices. The top socket is your only default PCIe 5.0 x4 socket, but you can also configure M2_4 to run PCIe 5.0 x4. The rest run PCIe 4.0 x4 speeds. Do you have a SATA-based M.2 drive? You’re in luck, as M.2_5 supports PCIe and SATA-based NVMe modules - a rare sight on today’s boards. If you’d like increased throughput or redundancy, the Z890 Ace supports RAID0/1/5/10 modes on NVMe. We find three additional USB headers (2x 19-pin USB 3.2 Gen 1 and a 20 Gbps front panel Type-C header along the right edge) hidden under the large, easy-to-remove plate heatsink. For what is almost considered legacy storage these days, the Ace also hides four SATA ports below the heatsink. These ports also support RAID0/1/5/10 modes, like NVMe. Across the bottom of the board are several exposed headers. You’ll find the typical stuff here, including additional USB ports, RGB headers, and much more. Below is a complete list from left to right. Front panel audio 4-pin RGB header PCIe Power (2) 2-pin thermistor headers 3-pin ARGB header (2) System Fan headers (2) USB 2.0 headers (3) System fan headers BIOS selection switch TPM header JDashboard Header Thunderbolt 5 header LN2 and Slow mode jumpers CMOS Reset 3-pin ARGB header Front panel The rear IO on the Z890 Ace has a lot going on and is packed with USB ports –15, to be exact. Starting with those, it comes with 11 USB 3.2 Gen 2 (10 Gbps) Type-A ports and four Type-C ports (2x Thunderbolt 4, 40 Gbps, and 2x USB 3.2 Gen 2, 10 Gbps). Video outputs for the integrated Arc graphics use the HDMI or Thunderbolt 4 ports. The three buttons, Flash BIOS, Clear CMOS, and Smart button) are in the middle and next to the Marvell 10 GbE port. The Wi-Fi 7 quick-connect antenna headers and the audio stack (line-out, mic-in, SPDIF) are on the right. There’s nothing out of the ordinary here, but there is a ton of USB connectivity. https://www.tomshardware.com/pc-components/motherboards/msi-meg-z890-ace-motherboard-review
  6. Washington DC - Large segments of Moroccan public opinion have expressed deep anger over the attempt by the UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy, Staffan de Mistura, to revive the option of partitioning the Sahara between Morocco and the Algeria-backed Polisario Front. Many have voiced concerns about the obstacles Algeria’s allies are trying to place in Morocco’s path to prevent it from resolving this territorial dispute in its favor. Heightening these concerns is the fact that de Mistura’s proposal came just two weeks after the European Court’s decision to annul the EU-Morocco fisheries and agriculture agreements. To put the discussion into its proper context, two key points should be highlighted. First, since the onset of this conflict in the 1950s, through the Green March and the intensification of tensions between Morocco and Algeria, influential members of the UN Security Council have maintained the firm conviction that the Algeria-engineered secessionist project is not viable from a strategic standpoint. It goes without saying that Morocco would never accept the establishment of a state that would cut it off from its African depth. As former UN envoy Peter van Walsum told the Security Council during a briefing on January 16, 2006, it is neither politically responsible nor realistic to expect Morocco to agree to the creation of an independent state in the Sahara. Building on this realistic assessment, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1754 in April 2007, which laid the foundation for the political process, giving prominence to Morocco’s autonomy plan. Morocco’s position has grown stronger than ever Second, the Security Council will not impose any solution that conflicts with or could undermine Morocco’s territorial integrity. If the Council could not force a solution on Morocco during a time when the country’s position was relatively shaky and had not yet gained the momentum and support it now enjoys from key countries, how could it possibly do so now? Even when former UN envoy James Baker presented his second proposal in the summer of 2003 and urged the Security Council to pressure both Morocco and the Polisario into compliance, the Council refrained from acting. Over the past two decades, Morocco’s position has grown stronger than ever. Morocco has been able to steer the political process in line with its historical rights to the Sahara and safeguard its territorial integrity. As I have emphasized in my recent book on the subject and in numerous articles, Morocco’s most significant achievement over the past two decades has been the burial of the referendum option and the emergence of the Moroccan autonomy proposal as the sole viable and politically sustainable solution to the lingering Sahara dispute. On the other hand, there is no connection between the European court’s decision and the UN envoy’s new-old proposal, nor is there any overlap between the two. The Security Council is the only body with the legitimacy to examine the dispute and propose the best way to end it. Does this mean that other parties have no interest in seeking to sway the European Court or the United Nations in an attempt to undermine Morocco’s recent diplomatic successes, or at least slow down the positive momentum Morocco has enjoyed in the past two decades? It would be naive to think that Algeria and its allies would remain idle in the face of Morocco’s ground-breaking achievements. Although Algeria understands it cannot reverse or undo the progress Morocco has made over the past twenty years, it is determined to redouble its efforts to keep the dispute on the UN agenda and thus prevent Morocco from closing it once and for all. The series of significant breakthroughs Morocco has achieved recently, particularly France’s recognition of the Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, has pushed Algeria to act swiftly and in all directions in hopes of derailing Morocco’s momentum. Algeria is well aware that France’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara is a game-changer in Morocco’s favor, and that France intends to go steps further to help Morocco consolidate its position. Algeria understands that this recognition is not merely symbolic and that France, as indicated in President Emmanuel Macron’s letter to King Mohammed VI, intends to play “its full role in all relevant fora” to assist Morocco in gaining increased support for its autonomy plan and sovereignty over the Sahara. The briefing that France’s permanent representative to the UN is expected to give before the Security Council on October 28 will be the first step in translating his country’s newfound commitment to preserving Morocco’s sovereignty over its southern provinces. Algeria fears that this briefing might include an explicit request for the Security Council to enhance its support for the Moroccan autonomy proposal, which could prompt the Council to gradually adopt a language reflecting its tendency to acknowledge that the Moroccan plan is the only viable option for reaching a final resolution to the dispute. As as result, the Algerian government hopes that de Mistura’s attempt to revive the partition proposal might push Security Council members to at least maintain the same language adopted in the resolutions since Resolution 2440 in October 2018, even though that language is in favor of Morocco. A brief respite for the sinking separatist boat While Morocco’s autonomy proposal has undeniably emerged as the most realistic and feasible route to a lasting resolution in the Sahara dossier, the network of support Algeria has built over the past four decades in many European capitals continues to maintain its narrative's stranglehold on the vast majority of Western academics, human rights activists and legal experts. And knowing that its talking points still hold currency in intellectual and activist circles despite the political and diplomatic consecration of Morocco’s plan as the best path forward, Algeria has tirelessly worked in recent months and years to undermine Morocco’s diplomatic breakthroughs and cast doubt on the legitimacy or legality of the agreements Morocco has signed with its European partners. One of the Algerian government’s key objectives has been to push the European Court to issue a ruling that casts doubt on the Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara. From this perspective, it can be said that the politically motivated ruling issued by the European Court earlier this month, which nullified the fisheries and agriculture agreements with Europe, serves the narrative Algeria seeks to promote — that the legal status of the Sahara has not changed since the 1975 ICJ advisory opinion and that the international community does not recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over the region. Even though the UN envoy harbored no illusions about the prospects of his partition proposal, especially as similar attempts have failed in the past and given that Morocco will never agree to take such a path, the mere mention of the possibility of partition is a lifeline to Algeria’s largely shattered dreams of separatism in southern Morocco. If anything, Algiers sees de Mistura’s desperate attempt to sugar-coat his failure on the Sahara issue as a golden opportunity to give hope to a visibly demoralized Polisario Front and its dwindling cohort of allies at the UN. For example, Algiers could use de Mistura’s proposal as proof that Morocco’s autonomy plan is not as impregnably dominant in UN circles as many had thought; that friends or sympathizers of the Polisario with a modicum of influence within the UN can still derail or significantly delay the resolution of the Sahara dispute on the terms of the Moroccan plan. The visible invisible hands behind de Mistura’s strange proposal In fact, insider reports have indicated that de Mistura sought to revive the partition proposal at the behest of Algeria and its shrinking cohort of allies in Europe and elsewhere. It could well be that the idea was whispered to the UN envoy during his surprising and controversial visit to South Africa in January. Never has any UN envoy before him visited a country that is officially not party to the conflict and known for hostility towards Morocco. Even Christopher Ross, the former UN envoy who is no fan of Morocco or of its autonomy plan, never visited South Africa. One should not be deceived by the press release in which the Polisario leadership stated its rejection of de Mistura’s partition proposal. This statement is primarily for media consumption, meant to muddy the waters and create the impression that the Polisario controls its own destiny and that Algeria is neither a party to the conflict nor does it dictate the Polisario’s decisions. In the unlikely scenario that Morocco were to show even the slightest inclination towards this option, the Polisario would not oppose Algeria’s long-term goal of establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. The hypothesis that the partition idea was whispered to de Mistura by Algeria and its allies is further supported by the fact that the Algerian government has been down this road twice before. In both cases, the proposal to divide the region between Morocco and the Polisario was presented through former Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The first time was in June 1978, during a meeting the former Algerian leader held with U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Bouteflika, who was then Algeria’s Foreign Minister, proposed the partition of the Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario. He assured Vance that Algeria and the separatist Polisario Front would not oppose Morocco’s plans to retain part of the region, including the phosphate mines and a portion of the coast, provided the Polisario could control the remaining part, which was under Mauritania’s control at the time. Mauritania was then facing a fierce military campaign by Algeria and the Polisario to force it to relinquish the area under its control. Algeria made a second attempt in November 2001. Bouteflika, who had by then become Algeria’s President, held a meeting with James Baker in Houston, Texas. The meeting took place just a few months after Baker, who was then the UN Personal Envoy for the Sahara, presented his first Baker Plan known as the Framework Agreement, which Morocco had accepted. That proposal — which Baker presented after receiving guarantees and assurances from Morocco that it committed to a devolution of authority to the territory’s inhabitants — sti[CENSORED]ted that the Sahara would enjoy autonomy for five years, followed by a self-determination referendum involving all residents of the region who had lived there for at least one year. While the proposal granted the Sahara wide-ranging powers, it also maintained Morocco’s sovereignty in all respects. Most importantly, it preserved Morocco’s territorial integrity, ruling out any attempt for secession from within or outside the region. This proposal was supported by influential members of the Security Council, including the United States and France. However, both Algeria and the Polisario categorically rejected it, as expressed in letters sent by President Bouteflika and the Polisario Secretary-General at the time, Mohamed Abdelaziz. During his meeting with Baker, Bouteflika once again raised the proposal and expressed his country’s and the Polisario’s willingness to discuss the option of dividing the Sahara as a solution to reach a final settlement. However, Morocco expressed its outright rejection of this proposal. And so, while de Mistura might have given a clear indication of his willingness to do Algeria’s bidding, he should have known that the notion of a potential partition is mere wishful thinking. For one thing, the UN envoy knows full well that the Security Council would not consider that proposal given the developments of the past two decades. And even if the Council were willing to entertain the idea of a possible partition, the fact remains that will never agree to anything that compromises its sovereignty over the Western Sahara. At the height of the war of attrition between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front in 1980, the late Hassan II brushed aside any talks of a possible division of the territory. In an interview with the New York Times on March 8 that year, the Moroccan monarch rejected a French and American proposal to partition the territory. “Morocco’s claims to the territory are not only unchangeable, but in my view, they cannot the subject of any compromise,” he said. Interestingly, de Mistura’s comments after floating the partition proposal suggest that he is well aware that the power dynamics in the Sahara dossier have decisively, almost irreversibly, shifted in Morocco’s favor in the past two decades. This was evident as the UN envoy adopted a more realistic tone when he shifted the discussion to the Moroccan autonomy plan. He notably stressed the positive momentum surrounding the Moroccan position and the growing support it has received from an increasing number of countries, including influential ones. In this sense, he seemed to acknowledge that the Moroccan autonomy plan is widely considered as the only solid basis for a final resolution of the Sahara dispute, De Mistura tellingly cited examples of conflicts that had been resolved through expanded autonomy, such as Scotland and Greenland, to make the case that he is not inherently hostile to the option of resolution through autonomy. Still, he stressed that prioritizing such a path in the Sahara case requires Morocco to clearly explain to the UN the specifics of its plan’s implementation in the concerned region. De Mistura’s desperation for quick results plays into Algeria’s hands If one were to read hastily the UN envoy’s briefing, it might initially seem to contain negative implications for Morocco, and one might think that de Mistura is attempting to bring the political process to square one. However, upon careful reading and close examination of every word he said, it appears rather that his briefing carried a clear recognition from the United Nations that the referendum option is no longer a viable option, as reaffirmed by all Security Council resolutions since the end of 2003 up to the present day. On the other hand, aware of Algeria and the Polisario’s intransigence and their refusal to explore any possibility of reaching a political solution based on the Moroccan proposal, it seems that the UN envoy has reached a point of despair, realizing he will not be able to make any progress in the political process. This led him to take a step that would make it easier for him to resign from his position. In his address to the Security Council, he stressed that if no progress is made within six months, the Secretary-General should reconsider extending his mandate. Knowing full well the impossibility of Morocco agreeing to the option of partition and Algeria and the Polisario’s refusal to negotiate based on the Moroccan autonomy proposal, he essentially unofficially announced that his mission would end after six months. Regardless of the content of the UN envoy’s briefing, from Morocco’s perspective, any talk of partitioning the Sahara is a non-starter. Such an outcome touches the core of the five-decade-long conflict between Morocco and Algeria and would grant the latter a strategic victory over Morocco at a time when the kingdom has garnered the support of most influential countries for its autonomy plan and its sovereignty over the Sahara. This is the essence of the conflict whose strategic importance for Morocco the UN envoy and his aides have failed to consider and understand. More intriguing was the fact that, both when he spoke about the partition and the Moroccan autonomy proposal, he seemed to put the onus on Morocco as he urged Rabat to come forward with more explanations and details about the autonomy plan. It seemed as though the UN envoy was stuck in 2007 when Morocco was in the initial phases of garnering support for its autonomy plan. Meanwhile, he overlooked a key and fundamental fact: While Algeria claims that people in the Tindouf camps are genuine Sahrawis, it has rejected request after request from the Security Council to conduct an independent census in the Polisario-controlled camps. Since the early years of Algeria’s embrace of the separatist project, there have been numerous reports and studies documenting that the majority of “refugees” in the Tindouf camps did not originate from the Western Sahara. According to a December 1977 report by the US Bureau of Research and Intelligence, “the refugee camps there also contain a significant number (conceivably even a majority) of Saharans who arrived from other areas of the desert (Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and even Morocco), either to escape the Sahel drought or because Algerian and Polisario spokesmen induced them to come.” And so, assuming that the partition proposal was a workable and realistic option, on what specifics would that proposal be based? Who, for instance, will be eligible to be citizen of the imaginary state that would be established in the southernmost part of the territory? Will Algerians, Mauritanians, Malians and even Moroccans from the Moroccan cities of Tan-Tan and Zag — who joined the Polisario — also be eligible to be part of that state? Has the mere fact that they have spent five decades in the Tindouf camps given them a right to claim affiliation to the territory? The day when Algeria accepts that a census can be conducted in the camps to enable the UN Security Council to assess the number of genuine Saharawis, and when it accepts to negotiate on the basis of the Moroccan autonomy proposal, the UN envoy would be justified in putting the onus on Morocco. Until this has not happened, it is up to Morocco to decide when and if the time has come to explain the autonomy proposal and to whom it should do it. ‘Sahrawi self-determination’ is the least of Algeria’s concerns in the Sahara By refloating the idea of the partition and expressing regret over the lack of response from the parties involved, he clearly displayed either his unawareness about or his feigned ignorance of the primary reason for Algeria’s embrace of the separatist agenda in southern Morocco. To be sure, Algeria’s relentless efforts to obstruct any progress towards resolving the Sahara dispute are not only due to its fear that Morocco might raise the issue of the Eastern Sahara. Instead, and more fundamentally, Algeria is in desperate need of access to the Atlantic Ocean, something that it hopes will materialize its ambitions to be the hegemon of the Maghreb region. Since gaining independence from France in 1962, the Algerian political and military elite have been imbued with the core belief that the only way to impose their dominance over the region and secure a safe outlet for exporting their natural resources trapped near the Sahara is to gain access to the Atlantic without having to pass through Moroccan territory. From the Algerian perspective, this can only be achieved by establishing an independent state in southern Morocco, which, due to its fragile economy and small po[CENSORED]tion, would be politically, economically, and ideologically dependent on Algeria. If this ideal (yet surreal) scenario for Algeria were to come to fruition, it would kill two birds with one stone: 1) Isolate Morocco geographically, cutting it off from its African depth. 2) Deprive Morocco of benefiting from the potential natural resources in the Sahara, thus denying the kingdom the financial revenues that could help it compete with Algeria for regional dominance. According to a U.S. intelligence memo dated December 12, 1977, Algeria's primary motivation for supporting the separatist narrative has never been a belief in the sacredness of the principle of self-determination, but rather the pursuit of its strategic interests. “Although Algeria’s apparent motive in supporting the Polisario Front is the principle of self-determination, the historical rivalry with Morocco for dominance in Northwest Africa is the main driving force. Algeria’s goal in this conflict is to establish an independent Sahrawi Republic in which it expects to have significant influence,” the memo argued. “This would deprive Morocco of the important economic resources of the region and hinder Morocco’s efforts to restrict Algeria’s future access to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, Boumediene opposes Morocco’s integration of Western Sahara because it would challenge Algeria’s ambitions for dominance in North Africa.” Almost fifty years later, the Algerian playbook on the Sahara remains the same: behind its flashy claims of principled support for “Sahrawi self-determination,” the Algerian establishment is fundamentally motivated by an urgency to gain access to the Atlantic while cutting off Morocco from a region that is historically significant to Moroccan identity and increasingly economically relevant to the kingdom’s leadership aspirations in Africa. And do, whatever the UN envoy’s motives in trying to breathe new life into the partition option, the very fact that he floated this idea means he is no longer able to explore any opportunity that could help push the political process forward. This means, most importantly, he has failed to grasp the real reasons behind the prolonged conflict between Morocco and Algeria. As I have suggested, any attempt to revive the partition option automatically provides Algeria with a new lifeline to buy more time. Hence, it won’t be surprising if Morocco refuses to engage with the UN envoy in the coming months. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2024/10/365878/un-envoys-partition-proposal-a-lifeline-for-algerias-faltering-sahara-strategy
  7. Video title: Best Fails of the Week | Funny and Insane 💥 Content creator ( Youtuber ) : FailArmy Official YT video:
  8. https://youtu.be/SKjry730mRw?t=3
  9. Rabat - Hichem Aboud, an Algerian political opponent and journalist, has been missing for at least three days following his arrival in Spain on Thursday. Aboud, a leading media figure who has been living in exile in France since 1997, is among those constantly targeted by Algerian authorities. On the day of his disappearance, he shared a video revealing that he was facing new assassination attempts from Algerian intelligence services. In an interview with Medi 1 TV on Saturday, Aboud's lawyer, Dalil Essakali Moulay Abdeljalil, spoke from Lille, France. He stated that Aboud had contacted him on Thursday morning, October 17, to share his plans to fly from Paris to Barcelona that same day. Essakali voiced serious concerns, stating that "Aboud's situation suggests a kidnapping rather than just a disappearance." He attributed this incident to the same individuals responsible for previous attempts on Aboud's life, asserting, "He is a target of the Algerian military junta." There remains uncertainty about whether Aboud was kidnapped while departing from Paris airport or if he voluntarily left France to vanish upon reaching Spain, as he reportedly did not contact anyone to confirm his arrival. Read Also: Algerian Journalist Jailed for Reporting on Algeria’s Date Exports All theories surrounding Aboud's disappearance point toward a possible kidnapping or a setup orchestrated by Algerian authorities. This mysterious case has sparked considerable concern and solidarity among many. In a statement to Morocco World News (MWN), Algerian journalist and political analyst Oualid Kebir expressed grave concern over Hichem Aboud's disappearance, stating, “The last one who called him on the phone was his wife. He told her he arrived and would leave the airport at once. But then, all contact with him was cut off completely.” Kebir noted the troubling coincidence that Aboud’s last YouTube video addressed his earlier kidnapping case involving Mouloud M’Henna and his father. “Aboud stopped all communication on the same day he posted his final video, where he condemned assassination attempts against him, allegedly arranged by Mouloud M’Henna, the son of the recently ousted General Djebbar M’Henna, who had led external intelligence since 2022,” he explained. Known for his fierce criticism of the Algerian regime, Aboud, author of "Mafia Des Généraux," has long been a target of government persecution. “We don’t even know if he is dead or alive,” Kebir added. He hopes that Aboud would return safely, describing him as “an extraordinary journalist and writer, blacklisted by the Algerian regime.” Aboud has also emerged as a prominent symbol of the Hirak movement in Algeria. His active presence on social media, especially through his YouTube channel, showcases unwavering support from demonstrators who chant “Hichem Aboud sahafi Hor” (Hichem Aboud is a free journalist) during his videos. This phrase not only reflects the Algerian regime’s aggressive efforts to discredit him, which include multiple in absentia convictions and international arrest warrants branding him as a "terrorist," but also serves as a critique of the local press. The regime has effectively silenced dissenting voices, leading to the imprisonment of many journalists and the closure of critical media outlets. As a result, Aboud faces intense vilification from the regime’s propaganda, which portrays him as a “traitor to the nation.” As the search for Aboud continues, the uncertainty surrounding his fate leaves many questions unanswered. His sudden disappearance, coupled with the alarming context of previous threats against him, has sparked widespread concern among supporters and fellow journalists. While calls for his safe return grow louder, the lack of communication raises fears about his well-being. Until concrete information emerges, the wait for confirmation of what happened to Aboud remains a source of anxiety for those who champion press freedom. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2024/10/365850/disappearance-of-algerian-journalist-hichem-aboud-sparks-concerns-over-possible-kidnapping
  10. Music title: Mouka - F Lil (Official Music Video) Signer: Mouka Release date: 10/10/2024 Official YouTube link: Informations about the signer: - Your opinion about the track (music video): Good
  11. Reading the European Court of Justice’s latest ruling annulling the EU-Morocco fisheries and liberalization agreements, one is immediately struck by the fact that the verdict is a political decision coated in a far-fetched legal reasoning that is not in accordance with international law. The court, to put it simply, lacks jurisdiction over disputes between the EU and a non-EU state. Intervention in such matters is the preserve of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Even so, the ICJ cannot take on cases involving two states or one state and an international organization unless it receives an explicit petition from the disputing parties. Taking international jurisprudence seriously In cases involving the right to self-determination, the consent of a third state is a core principle that has been codified in international jurisprudence. This explains why in the hours that followed the ECJ ruling, the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement stressing that because it did not take part in the court proceedings, it was ultimately “not concerned” by the ruling. After Australia and Indonesia signed in 1989 an agreement addressing the operation of East Timor’s maritime area, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) endorsed this principle in its judgment of June 30, 1995, in the dispute between Portugal and Australia. Portugal tried to have the agreement annulled, claiming that Australia had signed it without regard for Portugal’s administrative power or the Timorese people’s right to self-determination. Although the principle of self-determination is established in the UN Charter and the ICJ’s own law, the court rejected Portugal’s petition, underlining that the primacy of the self-determination principle and the consent to the court’s jurisdiction are two separate things. As a result, the ICJ ruled itself incompetent to adjudicate on Indonesia’s conduct without the country’s explicit request for such a legal intervention. The international body also rejected Portugal’s argument against Indonesian sovereignty over the territory in question. Specifically, the court noted that although East Timor was a non-self-governing territory and its people had the right to self-determination, the ICJ resolutions did not provide “a sufficient basis for deciding the dispute between the parties.” The European Court’s Violation of international law In light of this precedent, it is clear that the European Court is not only guilty of power abuse for encroaching on areas that do not fall within its competence, but above all, its behavior in the EU-Morocco case is at odds with the rules and customs of international law. As far as ICJ jurisprudence goes, the overarching lesson from the Portugal vs Australia case is that, because Morocco does not recognize the EU court’s jurisdiction on the legitimacy of its actions, it cannot cancel the EU-Morocco agreements without breaking international law. That the court’s ruling emphasizes the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination as the primary rationale for its decision to invalidate the Brussels-Rabat agreements should be enough to indicate this was essentially a political ruling primarily motivated by a thinly veiled – and self-righteous – desire to be on the side of the underdog. With the separatist Polisario Front having dexterously – though misleadingly and ahistorically – portrayed itself over the years as the “only legitimate representative of the oppressed Sahrawi people,” the court’s tone and reasoning betrays a moralistic need to be on the proverbial good side of history, even if that means slaying international law and disregarding historical facts. Polisario is not a subject of international law If respecting or upholding international law was really the EU court’s primary motivation, as it claimed in its ruling, it should have normally denied the Polisario’s petition for two straightforward reasons. First because Morocco does not recognize its competence, and second because Polisario has no legal personality that would allow it to appeal to EU courts given that it is not a subject of international law. As such, the argument that Polisario is a representative of the “people of Western Sahara” and that it consequently has the “capacity to act before the EU judge,” tramples on the principles of international law, especially the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. “A treaty creates neither responsibilities nor rights for a third State without its consent,” says Article 34 of the Vienna Convention. In its ruling, the European court incorrectly attributed the notion of third party provided for in the Vienna Convention to the Polisario in order to justify its decision to grant it the right to present an appeal against the Morocco-EU agreements. In other words, the court misleadingly argued that the Polisario is a legal entity and thus a subject of international law to make it appear as a representative of the people of Western Sahara. Yet, as Professor Abdelhamid El Ouali has demonstrated, the “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is applicable only to states and only to them.” Eva Kassoti, professor at the Hague University of Applied Sciences, has taken the same view in numerous works on the subject. For example, Kassoti argues that the content of the Vienna Treaty rules out any consideration of “the people of Western Sahara” as the third party in Moroccan-EU agreements. She also emphasizes the “problematic” nature of the interpretation that the Sahara has a legal status separated from Morocco as long as the Saharawis have the right to self-determination as a people living in a non-autonomous territory. In addition, in its attempt to invalidate the legality of the agreement, the Court overlooked Article 31 of the Vienna Treaty, making use only of the articles that help it make the case for the alleged violation of the agreements of the Saharawis’ right to self-determination and enjoyment of the territory’s natural resources. The European Court does not care about the principle of ‘subsequent practice’ More importantly, in its interpretation of the agreements’ alignment with the relevant rules of international law, the Court has purposefully overlooked the subsequent practice and behavior of the EU vis-à-vis Morocco. Eva Kassoti argues that the Court’s tendency to overlook the relevant rules of international law regarding the subsequent practice in the application of a treaty, “renders its findings questionable.” Over the past three decades, it has been clearly established that the subsequent practice of the EU member states has lent legitimacy to Morocco’s de facto sovereignty over Western Sahara. As I explain in my latest book, throughout the negotiation process and before the signature of all relevant agreements with Morocco, the EU knew full well that the Western Sahara fell within the scope of said agreements. Brussels knew, in other words, that the exclusion of this territory would be a non-starter for Morocco, making it impossible for the two parties to sign any agreement. And so, the attitudes and subsequent practice of EU member states throughout the intervening years has created legal obligations from the EU towards Morocco. Indeed, the overwhelmingly dismissive tone in which both EU member states and the European Commission have traditionally reacted to the court’s ruling constitutes an acknowledgement of the legal obligations that their subsequent practice over the past three decades have created vis-à-vis Morocco. It was thus not surprising when, just hours within the Court’s latest invalidation of the agriculture and fisheries agreements, Spain and most other EU countries rushed to reiterate their commitment to their strategic partnership with Morocco and their intention to abide by the terms of the agreements. These renewed commitments speak not only of Morocco’s strategic importance for the EU, but also of a certain awareness of the legitimate expectations that the EU’ subsequent practice has created in Morocco in terms of the recognition of its sovereignty over the territory. Simply put, both EU institutions and member states are deeply convinced that Morocco will not settle for any behavior or action that falls short of reflecting their attitudes and practice towards it as far as the Western Sahara is concerned. They understand that any questioning of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara could deal a serious blow to the growing partnership between the EU and its southern neighbor. In this regard, it is very telling that, while calling for the annulment of the 2019 agreement between Morocco and the EU, the Court decided to maintain its validity for a 12-month period. This means the Court appears to have taken into account the European Commission and the European Council’s concern that the annulment of the agreement could bring “serious negative consequences for the external action of the European Union, and of the legal certainty of the international commitments to which it has agreed and which are binding on the institutions and the Member States being called in question.” The European Commission and the Council of Europe’s entreaties to the Court to maintain the effect of the 2019 agreement stem from their concern that such a scenario could fatally and irreversibly disrupt EU-Morocco relations. Knowing that the agreements that the EU signed with Morocco over the past three decades and the subsequent practice and attitudes of member states have created legal obligations towards Morocco, the EU has long sought to avert a serious deterioration of its relations and potential legal battles between the two sides over the legal interpretation of their agreements. In this sense, the court ruling’s apparent consideration of this aspect is the only, tiny silver lining to an otherwise political and moralistic disregard of international legality. While providing a symbolic yet insignificant win to the Polisario and Algeria, the Court has afforded the EU, its member states, and Morocco enough time to work out a long-term solution out of this legal imbroglio in a way that will safeguard their strategic partnership while not questioning Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. Misleading criteria of ‘Sahrawiness’ True to its twisted reasoning in the Morocco-EU case, the Court made the outlandish claim that the people that the EU Commission consulted before the signature of the 2019 agreement with Morocco are not Saharawis. To the court’s biased eyes, these are simply “current inhabitant of the territory” whose majority are not genuine Saharawis, while the “majority of these people are in exile in Algeria” since the 1970. Here, the Polisario-friendly implication is that the status of Sahrawi applies only to those in the Tindouf camps. This raises the question of the court’s bases and criteria for what constitutes genuine Sahrawiness. If the refugees in the Tindouf camps are genuine Saharawis, why has Algeria rejected all the requests of the Security Council to carry out a census in the Tindouf camps? In its ruling, the EU court eluded the obvious fact that Algeria refuses to do so because it knows that the majority of those in Tindouf are not Sahrawis from the disputed territory in southern Morocco, but came from Tindouf itself, Mauritania, Mali and Niger. Another fact that raises serious questions about the Court’s motives and intentions in hailing the Polisario as the “legitimate representative” of the Sahrawis is the blatant lie in paragraph 19 of the ruling, where the Court claims that the Polisario Front was created in Western Sahara on 10 May 1973. Yet it is well known that the Polisario was not created in Western Sahara, but in the city of Zouirat in Mauritania. Moreover, it was created by a group of young Sahrawis who were not born in the territory. Worse still, the same paragraph contains another blatant lie that is unworthy of a judicial body that is supposed to be guided by impartiality and concern for the truth. According to the Court, Article 1 of the Polisario’s manifesto states that it is a “national liberation movement” whose members "fight for the full independence and restoration of the sovereignty of the Sahrawi people throughout the territory of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.” In fact, its manifesto states that it is “the unique expression of the masses, opting for revolutionary violence and armed struggle as the means by which the Sahrawi Arab people can regain its total freedom and thwart the maneuvers of Spanish colonialism.” The fact that the Court makes the shocking claim that the so-called SADR has existed since the first day of the creation of the Polisario shows the judges’ complete ignorance of the basic facts of the dispute, as well as their clear bias in favor of the creation of an independent state in southern Morocco. The Court’s determination to question the legitimacy of Morocco’s claim to the territory, and instead to support Polisario’s separatist claims, is also evident in paragraph 17 of ruling, where it refers to Resolution 2229 of December 1966, in which the General Assembly urged Spain to allow the Sahrawi people to exercise their right to self-determination. In paragraph 3 of the resolution, the General Assembly “calls upon the administering power to determine at the earliest possible date, in accordance with the wishes of the indigenous people of the Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco and all other interested parties, the procedures for holding a referendum under the auspices of the United Nations to enable the indigenous people of the territory to exercise their right to self-determination.” But in mentioning this article, the Court shockingly and mysteriously removed the part “in accordance with the aspirations of the indigenous people of the Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party,” where Morocco is mentioned as a concerned party along with Mauritania. A lawyer can be expected to read a case selectively, omitting some facts that don't serve his agenda, because at the end of the day his goal is to achieve a favorable outcome, regardless of the means he may use to achieve that goal. But a judge has a duty to be guided by impartiality and fairness. As such, he should disclose and consider all the facts and his decision should be based on a holistic analysis of the relevant facts. Any reading or analysis that is truncated or smacks of bias and deliberate omission or outright lies would lead to a truncated and biased result. This is the case with the European Court of Justice, whose decision-making process has been shaped by a biased and politicized analysis of the facts at hand. Polisario’s questionable legitimacy As I demonstrated throughout my book about the dispute, the existence of a full-fledge and distinguishable Saharawi people is a sheer figment of the imagination that was entirely created and cultivated by Algeria with the help of ideology-driven scholars and commentators. Charles Vanhecke, a correspondent for Le Monde in Madrid, pointed out in a June 1979 article that even though the Spanish leaders knew full well that “the Polisario is composed of half of Saharans from Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria,” they were willing to support the group under the pretext that it had “succeeded in creating common bonds will among the Saharawi po[CENSORED]tions.” A December 1977 report by the US Bureau of Research and Intelligence shattered the unfounded claim that the people in the Tindouf camps were originally Saharawi and hailed all from the Western Sahara. A very “large percentage” of the Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps are not native of the disputed Sahara territory, the report stressed, noting that they instead flocked to the region from Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and even other parts of Morocco. Most made that journey to Western Sahara “either to escape the Sahel drought or because Algerian and Polisario spokesmen induced them to come.” Mustafa Salma Ould Sidi Mouloud, a former Polisario police chief, made a similar point when he told me in a January 2020 interview that “Algeria and the Polisario want to do everything possible to prevent the international community from realizing that a third of the Saharawis in the camps are Rguibat from southwestern Algeria and have no connection with the Sahara.” Yet the EU court’s ruling appears to be based on the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in holding the consent of the local po[CENSORED]tion as a sine qua non for the agreements between Morocco and the EU to comply with international law (PSPRN). As El Ouali has eloquently shown , however, “PSPRN is an attribute not of peoples, but of states.” Many people in the Tindouf camps now have lost faith in the Polisario. Some blame the separatists for widespread corruption and the embezzlement of humanitarian aid intended for the refugees, while others - the majority, in fact - have simply stopped believing in the Polisario’s ability to put an end to their plight. Thus, rather than a national liberation movement or a legitimate representative of the aspirations of the Sahrawis, many in these camps today consider the Polisario as the cause of the perpetuation of their tragedy. Inconsistency with the UN-led Political Process In addition to lacking competence to determine the validity of the Morocco-EU agreements, the court’s decision uses jargon that is incompatible with the one employed by the UN Security Council, the sole body with the legitimacy to deliberate over the Sahara conflict. Whereas the UN talks of a political process to achieve a mutually acceptable and compromise-based political solution, the European Court’s ruling emphasizes that self-determination is synonymous with independence. The Court has clearly stated that the “people of Western Sahara” are engaged “in a struggle for the exercise of its right to self-determination and the creation of a sovereign Sahrawi state.” By using the phrase “creation of a sovereign Sahrawi state” the Court’s judges have clearly displayed their sheer bias, the outcome they wish to see materialize at the end of the UN-led political process, as well as their anachronistic reading of the conflict. By insinuating that the right to self-determination means necessarily the establishment of an independent state, the Court’s judges willfully overlook Resolutions 1541 of 1960 and Resolution 2625 1970 according to which the right to self-determination can be exercised through “emergence as a sovereign independent State; free association with an independent State; or integration with an independent State. Such a selective interpretation of the relevant rules of international law is unbecoming of a Court that is supposed to uphold international. Nowhere in the Court’s decision are these two options mentioned. Instead, the Court’s use of such jargon is reminiscent of the language used in the General Assembly Resolutions adopted between 1979 and 1990, which defended the right of the Sahrawis to self-determination and the establishment of their independent state. Not only did the Court display a tendentious understanding of the right to self-determination, but it also demonstrated amnesia within its ranks with regard to the ongoing UN-led political process in the Sahara affair. The more one reads between the lines of the Court’s decision, the more flagrant its bias becomes. Over the past 21 years, the Security Council has completely buried the option of referendum, focusing its efforts on getting the parties to agree on a face-saving, compromise-based, and mutually acceptable political solution. Yet the growing global consensus about the need for compromise and realism was not worth any mention by the Court, which only made a cursory mention of the whole political process initiated in 2003 and accelerated since 2007. Avoiding any mention of the UNSC’s repeated calls since 2007 on the parties to achieve a compromise-based political solution, the Court stressed instead that the UNSC resolutions have “regularly reaffirmed that any political solution must permit ‘the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara’ under agreements aligned with the principles and objectives enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.” The Court self-servingly preferred to limit its mention of the UN-led process to Resolution 34/37 of 1979, which describes Morocco as an “occupier” and emphasizes the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and independence.” It appears though as if the Court was engaged in a legal and political crusade whose goal was to demonstrate that the mere mention of self-determination in any UN document is tantamount to formal statement that the desired outcome of any such a process is the establishment of an independent state and that Western Sahara can by no means be regarded as Moroccan. In so doing, the Court seemed oblivious to the fact that Resolution 34/37 has lost relevance as far as the resolution of the conflict is concerned. Beginning in 1990, the General Assembly, which had long favored the option of independence in the Sahara, was stripped of the prerogative to examine the territorial dispute. Ever since, the Resolutions that the General Assembly has adopted over the past 17 years, the last of which is Resolution 78/85 adopted on December 7, 2023, “support the political process initiated by Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007).” What is more, after he Security Council took charge of resolving the dispute in 1990, it still explored the idea of a referendum to allow the po[CENSORED]tion of the Sahara to choose between integration with Morocco or independence. However, disagreements over voter eligibility led to the failure of the Settlement Plan , as well as of the Baker Plan in 2001 and 2003. The failure of the referendum approach ultimately led the UN Security Council to sideline, bury the referendum option. The term referendum has not been mentioned one single time for the past 21 years. Anyone who has taken time to read both the Security Council resolutions and the latest UN Secretary-General reports on Western Sahara can see for themselves that the UN's political process disqualifies an independence referendum and instead emphasizes the need for a compromise-based political solution. “To misname things is to add to the misfortune of the world,” Albert Camus famously said. Likewise, by misrepresenting the Sahara conflict, by turning international law on its head, and by oversimplifying the historical and social complexities of the Sahara conflict in order to reach a political and erroneous ruling, the European court has fallen in line with those who, in their doctrinal posturing as the saviors of the mythical Sahrawi people, feed the illusion of independence and thus perpetuate the diplomatic impasse and the accompanying social catastrophe. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2024/10/365638/morocco-eu-deals-ideology-politics-dictate-eu-courts-latest-ruling
  12. With Hurricane Milton bearing down on Florida in the US, there’s a very real risk that it could cause havoc to communication infrastructure, making it harder than ever to stay in touch with people in the area. But if you’ve got an iPhone, there are two built-in features that could let you communicate with loved ones and first responders, even when mobile networks aren’t functioning. This isn’t just hypothetical – there are plenty of examples of people using Apple’s services to connect when Hurricane Helene struck in late September. The first feature is Emergency SOS via Satellite. As the name suggests, this uses satellite connectivity to link your call to emergency services, providing you with help when cell infrastructure is too badly damaged to get your call through. Right now, it’s free for anyone with a phone from the iPhone 14, iPhone 15 and iPhone 16 lineups (see Apple’s full list of available territories to see where it works). Depending on where you live, you’ll also need to be running anything from iOS 16.1 to iOS 17.6 – Apple has a full list of requirements on its website. But the second, and more recent, feature is Messages via Satellite, which recently landed in iOS 18. Like Emergency SOS via Satellite, Messages via Satellite can give you service even when the normal messaging methods aren’t working. It isn't technically designed for emergencies and doesn't connect you to emergency services, but could connect you to loved ones if you're in a dicey situation without cell coverage. Considering how much damage Hurricane Milton is likely to cause to cell towers and the like, it could be an ideal way to check up on family and friends when normal messages just don’t get through. Here's how it works and how to try it. Both Emergency SOS via Satellite and Messages via Satellite are currently free to use for two years after registering your iPhone and neither require any additional setup – though the latter is currently only available in the US and Canada, for now. For the former, just dial 911 and your phone will connect to a satellite if it needs to. For the latter, upgrade to iOS 18 and open the Messages app when you don’t have cell or Wi-Fi service and you’ll be prompted to use Messages via Satellite instead. Just follow the on-screen instructions to connect to a satellite and start texting. If the recipient has an Android phone or isn’t using iOS 18 themselves, messages are sent over SMS via satellite instead of iMessage. In both cases, you’ll need to ensure you’re outside with a clear view of both the sky and the horizon in order to connect. Obviously, that might prove to be difficult if you’re in a stormy area that’s affected by Hurricane Milton, but you can still try regardless. Apple offers a ‘Satellite Connection demo’ that you can try before attempting to connect to a satellite. To do so, open the Settings app in iOS and go to Apps > Messages > Satellite Connection Demo. This lets you practice connecting to a satellite so that you know how to do it later. Apple says that you’ll need to turn on iMessage in your iOS settings before going off the grid. As well as that, anyone you’ve added to your emergency contacts or Family Sharing group will be able to message you using a satellite without you needing to text them first, so it’s worth adding any important people to your emergency contacts beforehand. As we mentioned, Messages via Satellite is only available in the U.S. and Canada for now, while Emergency SOS via Satellite is available more broadly. If you or a loved one finds themselves affected by an event like Hurricane Milton, these features could make all the difference. https://www.techradar.com/phones/how-to-send-satellite-messages-on-your-iphone
  13. It’s an exciting time to be in the market for a new ultraportable laptop. Qualcomm wants to make waves with its Snapdragon X Series of Arm processors, which boast incredible battery life. Intel just launched its new Core Ultra 200 “Lunar Lake” chips, which have a large focus on overall efficiency. And, of course, AMD is pushing its frontline Ryzen AI 300 processors in the laptop space. The HP OmniBook Ultra review unit we tested comes from the latter series of chips; specifically, it features a Ryzen AI 9 HX 375 processor. That powerful mobile chip is ensconced within an attractive and lightweight aluminum chassis. The design is understated, with the only bold move being a light blue power button that doubles as a fingerprint reader. The OmniBook Ultra proved to be a swift performer in our benchmark suite, putting it in contention among the best ultrabooks. Less is more when it comes to the OmniBook. The laptop doesn’t draw attention to itself, which suits those who like to fly under the radar sans blaring. The lid is simple and finished in aluminum with the HP logo polished to a mirror finish. Opening the lid reveals a no-nonsense keyboard deck flanked by two rectangular-shaped speaker grilles. The keyboard is dark gray in finish, while the top function row is a lighter shade of gray. The only design embellishment is the power button, which is finished in a pale blue and doubles as a fingerprint reader. The display is covered in glossy glass, which is a boon for increasing color fidelity, but amplifies reflections. The bezels are minimal along the sides, but are more sizable for the top and bottom (where you’ll find another HP logo). There are also two Copilot logos on the chassis. One is located at the base of the display lid, and is only visible when the lid is closed. The second is located under the left CTRL key on the keyboard. And if you didn’t already know that this machine was powered by AMD, two stickers are placed on the right palm rest to advertise the Ryzen AI 9 HX processor and Radeon Graphics inside. Regarding external ports, the OmniBook Ultra doesn’t include many. There are two Thunderbolt 4 ports on the right side of the chassis (a huge rarity for AMD systems, as Intel licenses Thunderbolt 4), while a 3.5 mm combo jack and a USB-A port are on the left side. However, the USB-A port has a fussy, spring-loaded half-cover that mirrors the contour of the laptop. This design is often included with laptops with a built-in Ethernet port, but I’ve never seen it for a USB-A port before. It seems like an unnecessary part that could become easily broken. The OmniBook Ultra measures 12.41 x 8.96 x 0.65 inches and weighs 3.47 pounds. That is slightly heavier than the larger Asus ZenBook S16, which weighs 3.31 pounds and measures 13.92 x 9.57 x 0.47 inches. The ZenBook S14 has dimensions of 12.22 x 8.45 x 0.51 inches and weighs 2.65 pounds, while the Dell XPS 13 (9345) measures 11.63 x 7.84 x 0.60 inches and weighs 2.62 pounds. HP OmniBook Ultra Specifications CPU AMD Ryzen AI 9 HX 375 (12 cores / 24 threads, up to 5.1 GHz) Graphics AMD Radeon 890M graphics (integrated) NPU XDNA 2, up to 55 TOPS Memory 32GB LPDDR5x-7500 onboard Storage 2TB M.2 PCIe NVMe SSD Display 13-inch, 2240 x 1400, IPS, 16:10, 60 Hz, Touch Networking MediaTek Wi-Fi 7 MT7925 (802.11be), Bluetooth 5.4 Ports 2x Thunderbolt 4 Type-C, USB 3.2 Gen 2 Type-A, 3.5 mm headphone jack Camera 1080p IR Battery 68 WHr Power Adapter 65W, USB Type-C Operating System Windows 11 Pro Dimensions (WxDxH) 12.41 x 8.96 x 0.65 inches Weight 3.47 pounds (1.57 kg) Price (as configured) $1,748.99 Kicking things off with the synthetic Geekbench 6 benchmark, the OmniBook Ultra flexed its muscles with wins in single-core (2,847) and multi-core (14,838) performance. The XPS 13 (Snapdragon X Elite) was nipping at its heels, scoring 2,797 and 14,635, respectively. Rounding out the slate of competitors was the ZenBook S16 (Ryzen AI 9 HX 370) at 2,765/13,282 and the ZenBook S14 (Core 7 Ultra 258V) at 2,751/11,157. The OmniBook Ultra had another convincing win in our file transfer test, where it copied 25GB of files at 1,708.23 Mbps. The next-closest competitor was the XPS 13 at 1,342 Mbps, while the ZenBook S16 lagged well behind in last place with 908.45 Mbps. The dominance of HP’s new OmniBook Ultra extended to our Handbrake test, which transcodes a 4K video file to 1080p. The OmniBook Ultra completed the task in 4:18, putting it nearly 30 seconds ahead of the second-place XPS 13. The ZenBook S14, with its newly launched Lunar Lake-based processor, took almost twice as long as the OmniBook Ultra to complete the Handbrake test (8:28). To stress test ultrabooks, we rely on Cinebench 2024, which we run through ten loops. The first run was the highest, at 960.85, while subsequent runs meandered through the mid-900s to low-900s. During the stress test, the Zen 5 cores averaged 3.1 GHz, while the Zen 5c cores averaged 2.37 GHz. During the test, the CPU measured an average of 70 degrees Celsius (158 degrees Fahrenheit). NPU and AI The Ryzen AI 9 HX 375 is nearly identical to the Ryzen AI 9 HX 370 in key specifications, apart from the NPU. The NPU in the former receives a 10 percent performance uplift, maxing out at 55 TOPS instead of 50 TOPS. To qualify for Microsoft’s Copilot+ PC certification, the PC must be capable of 40 TOPS, which means that the Ryzen AI 9 HX 370 easily clears the bar. Copilot+ PCs will use the NPU for features like Cocreate, an AI tool to augment your drawings, and Windows Studio Effects, which provides real-time effects for your camera. However, the biggest headliner for the NPU will be its use with the controversial Recall feature in Windows 11. Recall takes snapshots of everything you’ve done on your computer, which is then accessible by searching for keywords or browsing through a timeline of your PC’s recorded history. Microsoft now intends for Recall to become available for Copilot+ PCs in October via the Windows Insider program. Display on the HP OmniBook Ultra While many ultrabooks opt for OLED panels for deeper blacks and richer colors, HP sticks with tried-and-true IPS technology for the OmniBook Ultra. The 14-inch panel has a 16:10 aspect ratio and a relatively uncommon 2240 x 1400 resolution. Our review unit was equipped with the touch panel option, and the refresh rate clocks in at 60 Hz. The OmniBook Ultra covers 75.6 percent of DCI-P3 and 107 percent of sRGB, putting it about average in this assembled group of laptops. Maximum brightness measured 359.4 nits, slightly edging out the ZenBook S16 (357 nits) for second place. The XPS 13 took top honors at 456 nits. https://www.tomshardware.com/laptops/ultrabooks-ultraportables/hp-omnibook-ultra-review
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